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Is Tax Policy Hurting Venture Capital?
New firms are a maior source of new iobs in our
economy. Consequently, it is a matter'of some
importance whether the current financial inter-
mediation system adequately meets the financing
needs of such firms. By definition, start-up firms
lack sufficient cash flow to be self-financed, and
yet also have insufficient net worth to be attrac-
tive to traditional sources of external finance.
An earlier Letter (June 1, 1990) pointed out that
the economy would tend to "underinvest" in
such ventures unless financial instruments other
than pure external debt are available, since con-
trolling risk in this type of lending may require
that the lender assume equity and control posi-
tions as well. That Letter suggested that restric-
tions on banks' powers tend to limit their ability
to participate in the venture finance process,
and may diminish the supply of venture finance
as a result.
This Letter focuses on the effects oftax policy
on venture financing. We conclude that here,
too, recent public policy has tended to encour-
age the financing of "old" over "new" firms and
"safe" over "risky" projects. An examination of
trends in venture capital financing illustrates the
potency of the tax policy effects.
Tax effects
The argument advanced in this Letter is that tax
policy depresses venture financing to the extent
that it encourages debt over equity financing. In
new venture financing, in particular, equity posi-
tions are crucial to providing external investors
(that is, investors who do not own and manage
the firm) with sufficient power over the firm to
control risk.
There seems to be little disagreement with the
first part of this argument, namely, that tax policy
has tended to discourage equity financing. This
effect arises partly because debt payments are
deductible at the corporate level, while dividend
payments are not. As Pozdena showed in the
Letter of April 10, 1987, moreover, this "tax-
shield" effect likely has become more pro-
nounced in recent years, as corporate tax rates
have come to exceed individual income tax
rates. At the same time, tax reforms in 1986
raised the tax on real ized capital gains signifi-
cantly, further tipping the balance in favor of debt
finance. Historically, favored treatment of capital
gains tended partly to offset the tax-shield bene-
fits of debt finance.
Financing and control
The second part of the argument, that equity is
a key ingredient in controlling risk, has been the
subject of recent debate. Financial economist
Michael Jensen has argued that this traditional
view of equity does not fit the modern world in
which ownership and management are sepa-
rated. He argues that, in such a setting, high
levels of debt may be necessary to stimulate a
firm's management to perform well since com-
pensation is tied to the value remaining after
interest payments have been met. Large interest
payments thus give management a strong in-
centive to spur the performance of the firm.
Coupon debt in this context also provides a
mechanism for outsiders to gauge management's
performance, because it allows investors to
determine readily whether a firm is performing
well enough to meet interest obligations or not.
Although this new view may be relevant to
some corporations, the traditional view seems
better suited to the case of venture firms. For one
thing, new, small firms can be closely held, giv-
ing equity holders true control. In addition, the
cash flow characteristics of new firms are such
that large fixed interest payments are not pos-
sible. Of course, external debt can be structured
as original-issue-discount or zero-coupon debt to
lower the cash flow burden on young companies,
but this reduces the monitoring value of the debt
payment activity. Equity positions and direct
management authority thus are the most effective
means of exercising risk control in the context
of a new venture.on commitment flows; however, private venture
funding and total venture commitment flows ap-
pear to be extremely sensitive to capital gains tax
policy. Our model suggests that a 10 percent in-
crease in the capital gains tax rate causes a 16
percent decrease in real commitment flows. As
shown in the chart, this relationship means that
the most recent increase in the capital gains
tax rate (associated with the 1986 tax reforms)
depressed real commitment flows by $5 billion,




Consistent with this argument, reports in
venture capital trade publications suggest that
an increasing number of venture investors have
focused on post-startup activity in the past sev-
eral years; almost 20 percent of venture funding
In addition to depressing venture finance
generally, tax policy that discourages equity is
likely to have a disproportionately larger impact
on the financing of the riskiest ventures. This is
because equity stakes are particularly important
in managing risk in these cases. Startups are the
riskiest class of venture investment (with an aver-
age of 16 percent of all projects written off as a
total loss, according to a recent survey), and thus
likely to be the most affected by policy that dis-
courages equity positions. In contrast, expansion
financing and venture management buyouts have
write-off rates of only five percent and one
percent, respectively, making them relatively
more attractive.
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The supply of venture finance
In the U.S., intermediaries known as venture
capital funds specialize in performing these
external funding and control functions. Venture
capital funds are primarily private, independent
partnerships that identify venture projects and
attract investor financing for firms at the earliest
stages of development. They are the largest
source of venture funding in the U.S.
Venture funds receive business plans from
entrepreneurs seeking financing, and provide
financing "commitments" for selected proposals
on the "deal list" (typically, only one to three
percent of the proposals submitted are selected
for commitment). These commitments are not
advanced to the entrepreneur immediately, but
rather are "taken down" over an agreed-upon
period.
Venture fund managers must produce an
internal rate of return to the fund that is suffi-
cient to attract investor financing of these com-
mitments. If tax policy has the effect of raising
the pre-tax return required by investors, the result
may be a smaller set of qualifying deals, and a
decline in commitments.
Venture returns typically are in the form of
appreciation in the value of equity positions.
Hence, the feature of U.S. tax policy that is most
likely to have an influence on the effective rate
of return on venture finance and, therefore, on
the supply of commitments, is the treatment of
capital gains. Policy relating to the "tax shield"
effect of debt (that is, the relative treatment of
dividends and interest payments) is unlikely to
be as important; new ventures, particularly in
their early stages, tend not to have significant
income-tax exposure, and the advantage of
debt as a tax shield thus is diminished.
Evidence of tax effects
To determine whether u.s. tax policy has had
a significant effect on the availability of venture
financing, we explored the relationship between
taxes and venture activity in an econometric
model of venture commitments. That model
related commitment flows to economic activity,
stock market activity, and tax policy.
As hypothesized, changes in the magnitude of
the "tax shield" do not appear to have an effect
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oto 650 funds in 1988, likely also enhanced com-
petition and depressed internal rates of return.)
Pension funds' lower "hurdle" rate of return
permits more deals to be placed on the commit-
ment list, and thus should increase total venture
funding. Indeed, our model suggests that even
after controlling for other conditions, the 1978
relaxation of pension investment restrictions
increased venture commitment flows severalfold.
This evidence confirms that tax policy has potent
effects on venture finance.
As the share of pension funding increases, it has
the potential to partly insulate venture activity
from the effects of capital gains tax policy, since
the investment decisions of pension funds are
less likely to be sensitive to tax policy. We find
that the level of pension involvement itself is,
indeed, statistically unrelated to tax policy.
Despite increasing reliance on tax-exempt
investors, however, we also find that the tax
sensitivity of the non-pension investors remains
high, so that the reaction to capital gains tax
policy still is strong, as our model revealed.
Reconsider tax policy?
The findings in this Letter suggest a rationale for
favored tax treatment of capital gains relative to
that of ordinary income. Current tax policy fails
to recognize the important role played by equity
stakes in controlling risk, particularly in new ven-
tures. If new ventures are especially crucial to
maintaining an economy's vitality, tax policy may
have far-reaching effects.
went to venture firm buyouts in 1988, compared
to only nine percent in 1985, for example. Ven-
ture attorneys Testa and King also report that
recent venture partnership agreements and the
attitudes of venture fund investors reflect an in-
creased desi re for safe and short-term returns.
Finally, it is interesting to note that in Britain,
which has a more burdensome capital gains tax
policy than the U.s., early-stage financing as
a percent of total venture funding is less than
25% of that in the U.S. All of these observations
suggest that recent tax policy may be favoring
"safe" over "risky" ventures.
Pension funds
Another indication that u.s. tax policy signifi-
cantly affects the availability of venture financing
is that pension funds, which are exempt from
income taxation, have become increasingly im-
portant investors in venture capital funds. Until
1978, U.s. Department of Labor regulations re-
stricted pension fund involvement in venture
financing. Since then, pension funds' share of
the financing provided by venture capital funds
has increased sharply, reaching a level of about
50 percent of the total investment in venture
funds today.
The increase in pension funds' involvement
in venture finance is not surprising, given their
favored tax status, which permits them to tolerate
a lower pre-tax rate of return. In fact, the growing
involvement of pension funds may help to ex-
plain why internal rates of return at venture
funds have gone down more rapidly in the last
decade than returns elsewhere in the economy.
(The rapid growth of the venture funding industry,
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